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Rosen: Sweet Without the Bitter? The Administrative Transfer of Civilly

COMMENT
SWEET WITHOUT THE BITTER?1 THE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSFER OF CIVILLY
COMMITTED PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS IN NEW
YORK: SAVASTANO V NURNBERG 2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Three involuntarily committed patients were to be transferred from
Queens Hospital Center, a general hospital containing acute care
psychiatric facilities, to Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, a state-operated
psychiatric hospital.3 Dr. H. George Nurnberg, director of the Department of Psychiatry at Queens Hospital Center, determined at a hearing

that the patients satisfied the administrative criteria for transfer to a longterm ward at Creedmoor.4
The patients objected to this transfer.5 They alleged that this
decision violated their constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding transfer to a long-term psychiatric hospital, and that the
aforementioned administrative hearing denied them due process of law

1. "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations
on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant ... must take the
bitter with the sweet." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (plurality opinion), overruled
by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985).
2. 529 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. CL 1987), rev'd, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555 (App. Div. 1989), affd, 569
N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990). See generally I MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIL AND
CRIMINAL § 3.67, at 403-06 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (outlining the limited jurisprudence associated
with the transfer of civil committees).
3. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421, 422 (N.Y. 1990).
4. Savastano v. Numberg, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 421
(N.Y. 1990); see N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 29.11 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. COMP. CoDEs R. &
REGS. tit. 14, § 517.4 (1995) (requiring merely an informal administrative hearing prior to such a
transfer with no right of patient to call witnesses or cross-examine and no adherence to the rules of
evidence).
5. Savastano, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
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in violation of State and Federal Constitutions.6 The New York Supreme
Court of Queens County concluded that the statutory and administrative
authority under which the patients were to be transferred violated the
Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.7
Dr. Nurnberg appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department.' The Second Department reversed the judgment and dismissed the
action, holding that the aforementioned authority did not violate the Due
Process provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions.9
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed." The court, which
assumed, arguendo, that such a transfer implicated a constitutionally
protected liberty interest, held that the administrative hearing prior to
transfer satisfied the requirements of procedural due process." However,
the court also held that the patient could have judicial recourse by
instituting an article 78 proceeding
prior to transfer, which offers the
2
relief.'
injunctive
of
possibility
This Comment argues that transfer from a short-term, acute care
hospital to a long-term psychiatric facility 3 implicates a constitutionally
protected liberty interest, and that the aforementioned statutory and
regulatory scheme provides inadequate procedural protection for the
opposing patient. 4 No de jure negation of this liberty interest exists
upon confinement in a psychiatric hospital. 5 Additionally, this Comment argues that the holding in Savastano in no way serves the
constitutional interest in judicial economy and efficiency and often has
the defacto effect of actually hampering these goals. 6
Part II establishes that, through the creation of an elaborate

6. Id. at 404.
7. Id. at 410.
8. Savastano, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555.

9. Id. at 556.
10. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421, 422 (N.Y. 1990).
11. Id. at 424.
12. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R. 7805 (MeKinney 1994 & Supp. 1995). Article 78 of the CPLR
provides for judicial review of administrative determinations. Savastano, 569 N.E.2d at 423-24; see
infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
13. Although the New York Mental Hygiene Law technically allows commitment directly into
long-term psychiatric facilities, in practice this is the clear exception rather than the rule. See, e.g.,
N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 9.37 (McKinney 1988). In New York City, for example, the vast
majority of all initial commitments are made into short-term city hospitals. Telephone Interview with
Elliott Raines, Esq., Law Secretary to Hon. Maxine K. Duberstein, Supreme Court, Kings County,
N.Y. (Oct. 25, 1995).
14. See infra parts II-IV.

15. See infra parts II-IV.
16. See infra part V.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss3/6

2

1996]

ADMINISTRATIVE
Rosen: Sweet
Without theTRANSFER
Bitter? The Administrative Transfer of Civilly

mandatory statutory and regulatory scheme, New York has created a
constitutionally protected liberty interest for a patient who opposes
transfer. Although a patient surrenders some rights when involuntarily
hospitalized, Part II maintains that no general dejure negation of liberty
interests exists upon confinement.
Part IV documents the markedly increased stigma and "transfer
trauma" associated with a transfer from a short-term general care facility
to a long-term psychiatric hospital. Although such stigma alone does not
create a liberty interest, this Part reveals that the law mandates adequate
procedural protection when stigma is a factor.
Having established that transfer implicates a constitutionally
protected liberty interest, or at the least, the need for adequate procedural
protection, Part V argues that the administrative hearing currently in use
is violative of procedural due process. Additionally, regardless of the
constitutional arguments, the defacto result of Savastano has created the
potential for additional fiscal and administrative burdens. Finally, the
transfer regulations implemented by the New York Office of Mental
Health are ultra vires, in that they serve to abrogate psychiatric patients'
rights when its enabling statutes were promulgated with the express
purpose of increasing patients' rights. Part VI concludes by offering two
possible solutions to these infirmities.
IH.

STATE-CREATED LIBERTY INTEREST

17

By requiring specific substantive predicates prior to transfer"
through mandatory language in the relevant statutes and regulations, New
York has created a protected liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a

17. In Savastano, the court of appeals did not even consider whether or not transfer implicates
a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The court assumed, in arguendo,that such an interest was
implicated and proceeded to the procedural due process analysis. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d
421,424 (N.Y. 1990).
Liberty interests have been found, independent of state law, regarding both the inter-hospital
and intra-hospital transfer of civil committees in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Clarke,
434 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that transfer to a more secure hospital implicates
a patient's liberty interest and invokes procedural due process protections); see also Christy v.
Hammel, 87 F.1.D. 381, 390 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that transfer to a secure section of the same
hospital "triggered the plaintiff's liberty interest under the Due Process Clause").
18. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (holding that since
'"minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the
fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining
the preconditions to adverse official action"' (alterations in original) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 491 (1980))).
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state-operated psychiatric hospital. 9 For example, the Office of Mental

Health uses the following mandatory language in its regulation regarding
transfer: "No request for the transfer of an objecting patient shall be
made by the sending hospital until such patient has been given an
opportunity to appeal such request to the sending hospital's director."2
Additionally, the regulation requires that the director or his designee shall
consider numerous criteria when deciding on the issue of transfer, the
requisite legal standard being the best interests of the patient.2 '
Although this director or his designee has a waiver right in regard
to this regulatory criteria,' this waiver is limited in nature and has no
impact upon the mandatory effect of the regulation.2 3 Additionally,
while the director or his designee has the right to waive consideration of
two enumerated criteria, these criteria relate solely to jurisdictional issues
and are in addition to the elements regarding the "best interests" standard.24
Another method by which New York has created a liberty interest

19. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.11 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
14, § 517.4 (1995); see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983) (holding "that the repeated use
of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates
demands a conclusion that the State has created a protected liberty interest"); see also Joseph P.
Messina, Comment, Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson: The Demise of Protected
Liberty Interests Under the Due Process Clause, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
233, 252 (1991) (stating that "a statute... using what the Court recog[nizes] as mandatory language
(such as 'shall' or 'must') would almost certainly, in light of precedent, create a protected liberty
interest"); Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983
Actions, in 1 SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 317, 396 (Practicing
Law Institute ed., 1995) (noting that "shall" or "will" language in rules regarding hearings has the
effect of creating a liberty interest).
It is of no significance that the mandatory language "alleged" to create a liberty interest in
Savastano is in a regulation, as opposed to a statute. In Hewitt, it was mandatory regulatory
language, not statutory language, that the United States Supreme Court held created a liberty interest
regarding an administrative hearing. 459 U.S. at 472 (holding that the mandatory language contained
in regulations promulgated by the State Bureau of Corrections created a constitutionally protected
liberty interest).
20. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 517.4(c)(3) (1995).
21. Id. § 517A(c)(3)(i), (d)(1) (stating, interalia,that the following factors shall be considered
in order to serve the best interests of the patient, prior to transfer: (a) the proximity of the hospital
to the patient's significant others and (b) the ability of the sending and/or the receiving hospital to
provide adequate treatment by evaluating such factors as bed capacity and overcrowding).
22. See id. § 517.4(d)(2)(ii) (stating that "a patient to be transferred from a municipal or
general hospital in New York City to a hospital operated by the Office of Mental Health must satisfy
[additional] requirements, unless waived by the commissioner or a designee thereof').
23. Id.
24. Id. § 517A(c)(3), (d)(1) (discussing a number of the mandatory best interests elements);
id. § 517.4(d)(2)(ii) (dealing only with the transfer of New York City patients to state hospitals).
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is by instilling in the civilly committed psychiatric patient a reasonable
"expectation that adverse action[s] will not be taken... except upon the
occurrence of specified behavior."2' 5 The New York Mental Hygiene
Law requires that a patient receive care suited to his needs and with
respect for "dignity and personal integrity."'26
Additionally, a civilly committed patient has a right to an individualized treatment plan, as well as the right to participate in its creation and
implementation." It is unlikely that such an administrative transfer can
be argued as being outside the bounds of such a treatment plan.
Therefore, the decision to transfer is clearly subsumed within the
aforementioned liberty interest in treatment participation guaranteed by
the Mental Hygiene Law.28 Commitment itself is the strongest example
of an impact upon a treatment plan, and clearly implicates a patient's
liberty interest.2 9 Inaddition to commitment, other areas of the Mental
Hygiene Law relating to a course30 of treatment have been held to
implicate a patient's liberty interest.
1Il.

No DE JURE NEGATION OF LIBERTY INTERESTS

The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Savastano
implies that the involuntary psychiatric patient surrenders a multitude of
rights when committed. 31 This loss of rights is said to come under the
"penumbra of commitment," which does require procedural due
process.3 2 Such a holding ignores the authority under which such
commitments may be carried out, and discards the "best interests"
analysis found throughout the Mental Hygiene Law.33
"Involuntary confinement deprives a person of physical liberty to the
extent necessary to carry out a prescribed function of the parenspatriae
or police power. It does not have the legal effect of taking away any

25. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (holding that a state has created a liberty interest

under such circumstances).
26. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(a) (McKinney 1988).
27. Id.§ 33.02(a)(1 1).
28. See, e.g., In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1980) ("If the law recognizes the right

of an individual to make decisions about... life out of respect for the dignity and autonomy of the
individual, that interest is no less significant when the individual is mentally or physically ill.").

29. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
30. See, e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the power to
involuntarily medicate implicates a patient's liberty interest).
31. See Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990).

32. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.27, 9.31, 9.33 (McKinney 1988).
33. Id.
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other rights. 34 A patient may not be committed to the hospital solely
for the purpose of treatment.35 In addition to the "need of treatment"
requirement, there must be a showing that the patient poses a danger to
himself, society, or both.36 In this context, the parenspatriae power is
concerned with protecting the patient from himself and the police power
is concerned with protecting society from the patient." Once this patient
has been committed to a psychiatric hospital, both of these powers have
effectively been carried out. Any further action on the part of the hospital
is beyond this immediate power of commitment.
New York has long recognized a patient's right to self-determination-including involuntary psychiatric care-and the New York Court
of Appeals has held that this self-determination must be adequately
protected by procedural due process. 38 In Rivers v. Katz, the court of
appeals found that the due process clause of the state constitution
provides involuntarily committed patients a fundamental right to refuse
medication.39 Although the Rivers case dealt with involuntary medica-

34. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990) (No.
2771/87); see, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.03 (McKinney 1988) (stating that commitment
shall not "be construed or deemed to be a determination or finding that such person is incompetent
or is unable adequately to conduct his personal or business affairs").
35. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134 (1990); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574
(1975); see John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A ConstitutionalPerspective, 18
MENTAL & PHYsIcAL DIsABrLITy L. REP. 320, 324 (1994) ("The first Supreme Court decision to
address dangerousness was O'Connorv. Donaldson, which introduced the notion that dangerousness
is a major justification for civil commitment. Later, in Zinermon v. Burch, a majority of the justices
agreed that dangerousness is a constitutional requirement for civil commitment." (footnotes omitted)).
Many members of the medical and legal community believe that need of treatment alone is,
or should be, the requisite standard for the establishment or maintenance of involuntary commitment.
The following is a statement by the chairman of psychiatry and psychology at a Long Island
hospital: "It's not a question of civil liberties, unless you are talking about the liberty to be
David Firestone, For Their Own Good?
psychotic, and that is not among one's basic rights ....
With Public PressureMounting to Get the Mentally Ill Off the Streets, Lawyers Say They Don't
Always Get a FairHearing, NEWSDAY, May 31, 1989 at 8. Yet, the decisions in Zinermon and
O'Connor do just this; psychosis without dangerousness is constitutionally insufficient for
involuntary civil commitment.
36. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 134; O'Connor,422 U.S. at 575; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 112
S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1992) (restating that dangerousness is required to confine a mental patient, and
that the state cannot place the burden on the patient to show lack of dangerousness); Parry, supra
note 35, at 327.
37. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114, 1156-57 (6th ed. 1990); see generally Bruce A.
Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics: Assessing the Current Debate and
Outlining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 131 (1992-93).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.02(a)(1 1) (McKinney 1988) (providing that
patients have a right to participate in the creation of the treatment plan); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551
N.E.2d 77, 80-81 (N.Y. 1990); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986).
39. Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 340-41.
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tion-as opposed to involuntary transfer in Savastano-both decisions
implicate the due process guarantee of a patient's self-determination in
the course of a treatment plan. 4' Additionally, the regulations regarding
both involuntary medication and transfer use similar language in regard
to noncompliance. 4'
New York has defended its administrative procedures by analogizing
civilly committed patients to prisoners, who have no liberty interests.
Although prisoners have no "liberty interest is [sic] choosing the place
of his or her confinement,"42 any comparison between prisoners' rights
and the rights of the civilly committed is bound to be faulty. "[T]he
considerations underlying our penal system are vastly different from
those regarding our responsibility, care and concern for the mentally
ill."4' The language of United States Supreme Court decisions speaks
in terms of convictions, not civil commitments, as removing the liberty
interest of a prisoner regarding transfer from one facility to another.'
For civil commitment of psychiatric patients to be constitutional,
treatment must be the goal of such commitment, not mere custodial
confinement.4 5 Commitment must not be punitive in nature, and any
deprivation in liberty must be narrowly tailored to the purpose of

40. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990); Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 341.
41. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 517.4(c)(1) (transfer); id. § 527.8(c)(3)
(psychotropic medication).
42. Respondent's Brief at 23, Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990) (No.
2771/87); see Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
43. Savastano v. Numberg, 529 N.Y.S.2d 403, 408 (Sup. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555
(App. Div. 1989), aff'd, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990) (stating that "[w]e do not agree ... that a
transfer does not implicate due process protections" and rejecting the comparisons made to criminal
transfers).
44. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (holding that a "conviction[, not
an involuntary commitment,] has sufficiently extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower
the State to confine him in any of its prisons"). But cf Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp 1022, 1029
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding that transfer of a civil committee to a more secure hospital does invoke a
patient's liberty interest).
"One student author has suggested that, in cases involving mental patients, the Eubanks
approach 'seems more appropriate than that in Meachum and Montayne."' 1 PERLIN, supra note 2,
at 403 n.l 107 (quoting Note, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 357, 371 (1978)).
45. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
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confinement.4 6 Wholesale derogation of fundamental constitutional
rights is permissible only if such derogation is related to therapeutic, not
punitive goals.47
IV.

STIGMA REQUIRES PROCEDURAL PROTECTION 48

Although not necessarily implicating a liberty interest by itself, the
increased stigma associated with a transfer from a general hospital to a
state psychiatric hospital requires adequate procedural protection. 49 The
stigma associated with treatment in a psychiatric hospital is not open to
dispute and courts readily take judicial notice of its existence. 0
In Savastano, the court of appeals entirely failed to discuss stigma.
The appellate division recognized that stigma was inherent in an
involuntary commitment, but failed to acknowledge any increase in
stigma resulting from a transfer to a chronic-care state psychiatric
facility. 1 Although the Mental Hygiene Law explicitly requires patients'

46. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990); see also Kesselbrenner v.
Anonymous, 305 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that "[t]o subject a person to a greater
deprivation of personal liberty than necessary to achieve the purpose for which he is being confined
[for psychiatric purposes] is, it is clear, violative of due process").
47. See Harper,494 U.S. at 223 (stating that civil commitment must be viewed as presenting
"other circumstances" and cannot be permitted to have the same adverse impact on a person's liberty
interests as a criminal conviction).
48. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,631 (1979) (stating that "[the right to be free from
wrongful incarceration, physical intrusion, and stigmatization has significance for the individual
surely as great as the right to an abortion" (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
49. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (stating that "the stigmatizing consequences of
a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment... constitute the kind of
deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections').
50. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979).
[I]t is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital ... can engender
adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we label this phenomena "stigma"
or choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize that it can
occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.
Id.
51. Savastano v. Numberg, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561 (App. Div. 1989), affid, 569 N.E.2d 421
(N.Y. 1990).
The stigmatization associated with mental illness is not limited solely to the need for
psychiatric treatment. Societal perception of "stand alone" psychiatric facilities carries with it a
unique, additional brand of stigma. See Ed Struzik, MDs Buoys Grey Nuns Supporters, EDMONTON
J., Apr. 18, 1994, at BI ("Dr. Lorne Wameke, head of psychiatry for the Grey Nuns, said the trend
in psychiatry is to move away from the kind of large institution that is being proposed for Mill
Woods. . . . [T]he large institution enhances the stigma associated with psychiatric illness.");
Marybeth Burke, HospitalsSeize New Opportunities in State PrivatizationEfforts, HOSPITALS, Apr.
5, 1992, at 50, 51 ("[']he privatization process will allow clients to be treated in their own
communities in normal settings, offsetting the stigma that is often associated with facilities geared
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clinical records to remain confidential, 2 the appellate division ignored
the de facto realities regarding this confidentiality in dismissing its
relevance to an increase in stigma upon involuntary transfer.53 While
"stigma is... absent when confidentiality is maintained,"'54 true
confidentiality regarding the location of a psychiatric patient is not
adequately protected.5
The increase in stigma regarding the location of the patient is not
difficult to identify. If a patient were in the psychiatric ward of a general
hospital, this hospitalization does not carry the inference that treatment
is for a psychiatric illness. This is not generally the case when a patient
is transferred to a state psychiatric hospital:
The cases of the patient-plaintiffs herein are illustrative. All were
patients at Queens Hospital Center, a general hospital providing general
inpatient medical services not limited to psychiatric care.... [R]elation
of the fact that they were patients [there] does not, by itself, convey the
information that they were confined for treatment of mental illness.
However, Queens Hospital Center sought to transfer them to
Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, a State facility operated ...exclusively
for the treatment of mental illness. Had the transfers to Creedmoor been
carried out, anyone informed that the individuals were Creedmoor
Psychiatric Center patients would know that they were treated for
56
mental illness. The name alone broadcasts that information ....
The court of appeals in Savastano failed to consider the trauma

solely to the mentally ill.").
52. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.13(c) (McKinney 1988) (mandating that patients'
psychiatric records are not public records).
53. See Savastano, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
54. M. Gregg Bloche & Francine Coumos, Mental Health Policyfor the 1990s: Tinkering in
the Interstices, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 387, 392 (1990); see also Edwin J. Mikkelsen,
Mental Illness, 269 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 417 (1993) (reviewing PAUL J. FINK & ALLAN TASMAN,
STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1992)).

55. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.02 (McKinney 1988) (providing that contacts with
outsiders such as friends and employers must be maintained, without stating that they are subject to
the confidentiality requirements of the Mental Hygiene Law).
56. Appellant's Brief at 17, Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990) (No.
2771187). The stigmatization associated with institutions such as Creedmoor has found description
outside of the arguments proffered by appellants in Savastano. See, e.g., The CreedmoorExperiment:
Vacation as Therapy, NEWSDAY, Feb. 6, 1983, at 11 (stating that "[the physical image of
Creedmoor itself is ominous-a towering medical building of dreary beige brick and wire enclosed
windows looming near the Grand Central Parkway in Queens Village, like everyone's nightmare of
what a mental hospital looks like"); see also OutdoorSculptures to Soften Creedmoor'sImage, NEW
YoRK DAILY NEWS, Nov. 7, 1979, at 14-15 (describing that "[flor generations of Queens residents,
the Creedmoor Psychiatric Center in Queens Village has been a place of mysterious foreboding").
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associated with a transfer from one psychiatric hospital to another.57
"While transfer may be viewed by professionals as a routine procedure,
the patient and his family often experience transfer as a stressful and
intimidating event and as an ongoing crisis that may take weeks or even
months to resolve. The transfer process requires special understanding
and special management."58 At the very least, this trauma requires that
patients receive procedural protection against the concomitant stigma

upon transfer.
V. HEARING Is CONSTITUTIONALLY INADEQUATE

Thus, a constitutionally protected liberty interest exists on the issue
of transfer from a short-term general hospital to a long-term psychiatric
hospital.59 Additionally, the stigmatizing consequences of such a
transfer mandate adequate procedural protection, regardless of whether
or not a liberty interest is implicated.' This Part argues that the
administrative framework, which must be followed prior to such a
transfer, is constitutionally inadequate and procedurally unfair.6'
An objecting patient is entitled to an appeal of the decision to
transfer him or her to a long-term care psychiatric facility.62 This appeal
is heard by the director of the sending hospital or his designee.6 3 Thus,
the person conducting the hearing and the person seeking the transfer are

57. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990).
58. Shugar et al., Moving Experiences: A Model for Inpatient Transfer Based on Interviews

with Patientsand Their Families, 37:10 HOSe. AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1035 (Oct. 1986).
Avoidance of transfer trauma may be subject to greater procedural protection than stigma
upon transfer requires; the issue of whether or not transfer trauma may give rise to a constitutionally
protected liberty interest was answered in the affirmative by the Second Circuit. Yaretsky v. Blum,
629 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (reversing based on the
issue of state action, and never reaching the liberty interest issue of transfer trauma).
59. See supra notes 17-58 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
61. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1278-94 (1975)
(enumerating the following factors, "roughly in the order of priority," that have been considered to
be elements of a fair hearing: (1) an unbiased tribunal; (2) notice of the proposed action and the
grounds asserted for it; (3) an opportunity to propose reasons why the proposed action should not
be taken; (4) the right to call witnesses; (5) to know the evidence against one; (6) to have decision
based only on the evidence presented; (7) counsel; (8) the making of a record; (9) a statement of
reasons; (10) public attendance; and (11) judicial review).
62. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. AND REGS. tit. 14, § 517A(c)(3) (1995) (providing that "[n]o request
for the transfer of an objecting patient shall be made by the sending hospital until such patient has
been given an opportunity to appeal such request to the sending hospital's director").
63. Id. § 517.4(c)(3)(i).
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likely to be either the same person or co-workers.' In fact, this was the
situation in Savastano.6' This hearing may be conducted without regard
to the rules of evidence, the ability of the patient to cross-examine
witnesses, and without the necessity of keeping a record.' The hearing
officer must review the patient's clinical history, give the opportunity for
the patient to voice objection, and consider enumerated criteria for
67
transfer.
To determine whether or not this procedural framework meets the
requirements of procedural due process, the appropriate inquiry is into
the private interest that will be affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest, and the government's interest in the proceeding. 68 This
"accuracy-oriented" approach is known as the three part Mathews

analysis, and is the current model employed by the United States
Supreme Court in determining "what process is due. 69

64. See id.
65. Savastano v. Numberg, 529 N.Y.S.2d 403, 409 (Sup. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555
(App. Div. 1989), affd, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990).
66. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.11 (McKinney 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
14, § 517.4 (1995).
67. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 517.4 (1995).
68. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The "Mathews approach," employed by
the New York Court of Appeals in Savastano, received much academic criticism. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (2d ed. 1988). The Eldridge
Court's unwillingness to consider values beyond accuracy of result in the context of a
utilitarian balancing test when deciding what process is due, and the Court's grant of a
strong presumption of constitutionality to statutory procedural provisions, amount to a
serious abdication of traditional notions of judicial responsibility under the due process
clauses.
Id.
[A]t a minimum, procedural due process contemplates some kind of hearing--an
opportunity to join issue, through the presentation of evidence to a decision maker who
is then obliged to reach a reasoned determination on the basis of the submissions.
Underlying this conception [in Mathews] is the vital interest in promoting an accurate
decision, in assuring that facts have been correctly established and properly characterized
in conformity with the applicable legal standard ....
[Yet, flundamental to the concept of procedural due process is the right to a
reasoned explanation of government conduct .... It is crucial that this value be seen as
distinct from the concern about administrative accuracy-the interest in correcting wrong
decisions. Obviously, the two are related .... I would insist that the respect for
individual autonomy that is at the foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct
obligation upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision.
Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: MonitoringAdministrative Discretion Through a
Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Cmi. L. REV. 60, 76-78 (1976).
69. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541
(1985) (stating that "[the right to due process 'is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by
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The private interest affected has been established as a liberty
interest.7 ° At the very least, the stigma and "transfer trauma" associated
with such a transfer also mandates adequate procedural protection. 7 At
most, New York has created a constitutionally protected liberty interest
regarding such a transfer.72
The court of appeals in Savastano downplayed the risk of erroneous
deprivation.73 The court characterized the decision regarding transfer as
being primarily medical in nature, and thus better left to medical
professionals.74
There are numerous problems with this characterization. A cursory
analysis of the elements, which merit consideration prior to transfer,
reveals that they are essentially non-clinical in nature.7 Examples of
some of these factors are proximity of family and friends to the sending
hospital, availability of services, and bed capacity.76 These criteria
require no clinical expertise or skill and do not need to be "left to those
who have expertise in that field. 77
Even if one accepted the court of appeals' characterization of the
transfer decision as being primarily medical in nature, the regulation in
question in no way guarantees that the person hearing the appeal will be

constitutional guarantee' . . . once it is determined that the due process clause applies, 'the question
remains what process is due' (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974), and Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), respectively)).
70. See supra notes 17-58 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
73. Savastano v. Nurnberg, 569 N.E.2d 421, 424 (N.Y. 1990).
74. Id.
75. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 517A(c)(3) (1995).
76. Id.
77. Savastano, 569 N.E.2d at 424 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979)). The
patient's right to a judicial hearing regarding the initial transfer determination has found support in
recent decisions. See, e.g., In re Jerome G., 607 N.Y.S.2d 709, 710 (App. Div. 1994).
The "so-called" medical-legal distinction has been the subject of much academic criticism.
See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 111 (1985). Mashaw
argues that the Parhamcourt did not believe that a minor needed a hearing prior to commitment to
a mental institution,
apparently in substantial part, because a hearing would provide little additional protection
from error .... Yet, somehow, when in Vitek the question was whether a prisoner should
have a hearing prior to being transferred to a mental hospital, the suggestion that
psychiatric judgment was involved elicited the following judicial response: "The medical
nature ofthe inquiry ... does not justify dispensing with due process requirements. It is
precisely [tihe subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses that justify the
requirement of adversary hearings."
Id. (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980)).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss3/6

12

19961

ADMINISTRATIVE
TRANSFER
Rosen: Sweet
Without the Bitter?
The Administrative Transfer of Civilly

a medical professional." Not only does the statute speak of a designee
of the hospital director-who may or may not be a medical professional--but it also fails to specify whether the director himself need be
medically trained.7"
The question arises as to the impartiality of the factfinder in such a
proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has generally required such
impartiality.8 ° An impartial factfinder "helps to guarantee that life,
liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or
distorted conception of the facts or the law.""1 As stated previously, the
factfinder in such a hearing may be party to the dispute, and as such,
may have a constitutionally impermissible conflict of interest.82 Additionally, as stated by the trial court in Savastano, the pressure to relieve
overcrowding in city and municipal hospitals may also adversely affect
the impartiality of the factfinder:
The mere fact that the transfer might be motivated by the desire or
necessity to alleviate overcrowding to meet the demand for inpatient
treatment in acute-care psychiatric facilities is a conflict which prevents
the director of the transferring facility from deciding the issues in an
unbiased and impartial manner. Under present rules, this same director
may apply for an order of transfer and thereafter may be called upon
to review his own decision should objection be raised.83
As part of the Mathews analysis regarding erroneous deprivation of
liberty, 4 the court of appeals in Savastano opined that "any potential
for undue influence [regarding the transfer decision] is offset by the
receiving facility's right to refuse any transfer [that] it finds inappropriate."8" Yet, this right of refusal does not carry with it the right of the

78. N.Y. CoMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 517.4(c)(3)(i) (1995) (providing that the
hospital's director, unit chiefs, supervisors or psychiatrists are appropriate parties to hear the appeal).
79. Id.
80. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).

81. Id.
82. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local No. 115 v. Yahn & Mc
Donnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 138 (1986), aff'dper curiam, 481 U.S. 735 (1987) (stating that although
there is a presumption of factfinder impartiality, all that need be shown to rebut the presumption is
a "possible temptation" or an "underlying incentive" to manifest bias). The temptation is evident in
this situation. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
83. Savastano v Nurnberg, 529 N.Y.S.2d 403, 409 (Sup. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555
(App. Div. 1989), affd, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990).
84. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
85. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421, 425 (N.Y. 1990). But see Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 539 (1981) (holding that absent "the necessity of quick action by the State or the
impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process," a post-deprivation hearing would
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objecting patient to be heard, and thus fails to ameliorate the constitutional infirmities of the initial transfer hearing.86 The United States
Supreme Court has stated that even when the interest under consideration
is "not one of great consequence," 87 minimal due process requires some
right to be heard. 8
In addition to this "right of refusal" vested in the receiving hospital,
the court of appeals stated that any possibility of erroneous liberty
deprivation would be offset by the availability of an article 78 proceeding
subsequent to the transfer.89 Yet, this so-called remedy also fails to cure
the constitutional infirmities of the administrative transfer hearing. An
article 78 proceeding is essentially a writ of mandamus to review, which
places the burden on the patient to show that the administrative
determination was arbitrary and capricious. 90 This procedure falls short
of the constitutional guarantee of an impartial factfinder determining
whether or not transfer to a long-term state psychiatric center is appropri91
ate.
The court of appeals summarily dismissed the due process
importance of a patient's ability to cross-examine witnesses.9 z In
93
support of this position, the court quoted Basciano v. Herkimer:
"[T]he value of cross-examination to discredit a professional medical
opinion at best is limited." 94 Yet, as stated previously, the enumerated
factors considered concerning transfer contain mostly non-clinical components.9 Absent the medical characterization espoused in Basciano, this
transfer determination falls short of due process requirements. When
decisions involve questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity

be constitutionally inadequate).
86. N.Y. COM. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 517A(g)(iv) (1995) (providing that "[i]f the
receiving hospital determines that the patient is not appropriate for admission, the order of
transfer... may be canceled"). The regulation fails to provide for any patient input into the
decision.
87. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983).
88. Id. at 472 (stating that in order to satisfy procedural due process, respondent was entitled

to offer any "statement respondent wished to submit").
89. Savastano, 569 N.E.2d at 423-24 (stating that "a patient who is dissatisfied with a transfer
determination may challenge it by commencing an article 78 proceeding").
90. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 7803 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1995); DAVID D. SIEGEL,
NEW YORK PRACTICE 870-97 (2d ed. 1991).
91. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
92. See Savastano, 569 N.E.2d at 425.
93. 605 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
94. Id. at 611.
95. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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96
to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

The inability to cross-examine the facility's witnesses prevents a
patient's attorney from eliciting such pertinent information as the
witnesses' familiarity with the patient, what information the witnesses
relied upon in forming their opinions, and the extent to which any

administrative considerations such as bed space or budgetary concerns
may have influenced a decision to recommend transfer, all of which
touch upon the reliability of the testimony of any witness in the
administrative proceeding.97

The final element of the Mathews analysis involves the state's
interest in the transfer, taking into account the requisite "fiscal and
administrative burdens that [a judicial hearing] would entail."9 8 The
court of appeals in Savastano concluded that "significant administrative
and fiscal burdens... would result from the necessity of holding a prior
judicial hearing each time an involuntary patient objects to being
transferred to a State institution."99 This conclusion is empirically

wrong. The effect of denying the right to a judicial hearing has been to
hamper, not help, the goals of economy and efficiency.
In order to meet the current requirements for the administrative
hearing, the hospital must produce a physician as a witness." This
would not change if the hearings were conducted in front of a judge."'
The hospital director or his designee already must sacrifice his or her
time to conduct such a hearing. 2 Therefore, it is unlikely that the
fiscal and administrative cost will increase much, if at all, if the hearing

96. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980) (holding that there is a right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses prior to a transfer from a penitentiary to a psychiatric
institution).
97. Appellant's Brief at 34, Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990) (No.
2771187). In Savastano, the court of appeals downplayed the impact of institutional pressures such
as overcrowding on the proceeding's impartiality. The court stated that "such concerns are relevant
to decisions regarding treatment, inasmuch as overcrowding has a direct impact on the level and
quality of hospital services." 569 N.E.2d at 425. Yet, as stated previously, overcrowding is but one
of many factors which must be considered in a transfer proceeding.
98. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
99. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421, 425 (N.Y. 1990) (concluding from the holding
in Parham that permitting such a judicial hearing would "accomplish little else than the diversion
of scarce resources from the care and treatment of mentally ill patients").
100. N.Y. CoMp. CODES FL & REGS. tit. 14, § 517A(c)(3) (1995).
101. See, e.g., In re Jerome G., 607 N.Y.S.2d 709,710-11 (App. Div. 1994) (stating that when
a judge entertains a transfer hearing, the same requisite elements must be established).
102. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 517.4(c)(3) (1995) (providing that "[n]o request
for the transfer of an objecting patient shall be made by the sending hospital until such patient has
been given an opportunity to appeal such request to the sending hospital's director").
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is instead conducted by a judge.
This argument is bolstered by the fact that "special terms" are in
place which hold weekly calendars to review cases involving the Mental
Hygiene Law. These "special terms" consist ofjudges and clerks who are
thoroughly familiar with this area of the law and are able to move cases
through quickly and efficiently." 3 Therefore, they provide a "ready
solution" to the constitutional infirmities inherent in the current
administrative transfer framework.
Arguing in support of this premise, the appellant in Savastano stated
that "[s]ince the special terms presently hold and historically have held
regular weekly calendars to deal with mental health matters such as
commitment and medication hearings, transfer hearings can continue to
be incorporated into said calendars (as is presently the case). ' t "°
Although judges had long incorporated transfer hearings into the Mental
Hygiene calendar, the "unfortunate effect" of Savastano has been to
bifurcate this hearing, even when it would clearly be in the interest of
judicial economy and efficiency to incorporate.' l5
Historically, hospitals have sought transfer in concert with receiving
a court-ordered, six-month retention."° A patient is guaranteed the right

103. For example, the New York Supreme Court of Kings County utilizes a fixed staff of clerks
and a judge who has expertise in the Mental Hygiene Law and criminal commitments. This part of
the court is extremely specialized and efficient, issuing on average one thousand mental hygiene
warrants, inter alia, per annum. Telephone Interview with Elliott Raines, Law Secretary to Hon.
Maxine K. Duberstein, Supreme Court, Kings County (Oct. 25, 1995).
104. Brief for Appellant at 35, Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990) (No.
2771/87).
105. Although Savastano does not prevent a judge from entertaining a hearing on transfer if he
or she so wishes, the personal experience of this author with the Mental Hygiene Part is that judges
generally refuse to do so when the issue is presented, even when economy and efficiency would
clearly be the result. It should be noted that the New York Court of Appeals has emphasized that
a central aim of judicial discretion is the promotion of economy and efficiency. See, e.g., Kane v.
Parry, 364 N.E.2d 846 (N.Y. 1977). For a defense of the "judge's position," see infra note 108.
Even for those judges who do not explicitly refuse to entertain transfer hearings, the current
practice is that the transfer issue is rarely, if ever, raised by the hospital at a commitment hearing
subsequent to Savastano. Westchester County is the only jurisdiction in which transfer hearings are
currently tried in court. Telephone Interview with Dennis B. Feld, Assistant Director of Mental
Hygiene Legal Service, 2d Dep't. (Jan. 23, 1995).
106. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.33(b) (McKinney 1988) (providing that the first period
of retention requiring court authorization not to exceed six months); Interview with Elliott Raines,
Law Secretary to Hon. Maxine K. Duberstein, Supreme Court, Kings County (Jan. 22, 1994)
("Hospitals, prior to the Savastano decision, traditionally sought, and continue to administratively
seek, transfer orders in concert with their six-month orders of retention. This is so because this was
now for the 'long haul,' and the city hospitals want to free up beds.").
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to a judicial hearing when such a commitment is sought. 0 7 Although
prior to Savastano the hearings on commitment and transfer would have
been condensed into one judicial proceeding, this does not represent
current practice!' °8 After the retention hearing, the relevant parties must
return to the hospital for a transfer hearing. The expenditure of legal and
medical professional time is greatly increased under such a scenario, and
defeats the underlying purpose of the third part of the Mathews analysis.
The final consideration which must be given to New York's interest
in economy and efficiency concerns the aforementioned "remedy" of an
article 78 proceeding." 9 The substitution of an article 78 proceeding
for a Mental Hygiene Law article 9 hearing has the effect of hampering
the goals of economy and efficiency, as does the failure to condense
commitment and transfer hearings into one proceeding."' The amount
of paperwork and pre-hearing court involvement in an article 9 hearing
is minimal."' An article 78 proceeding, on the other hand, is much
more complex. It involves, inter alia, notice of petition, supporting
affidavits, and motion papers." 2 Most importantly, the date for such a
hearing "cannot be set for earlier than the 20th day after service.""' It
is questionable that the use of a relatively complex article 78 proceeding
in lieu of a relatively simple article 9 hearing on the issue of transfer will
advance an economy-efficiency objective.
Consideration also must be given to the scope of the Office of
Mental Health regulations for administrative psychiatric transfer. These

107. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.33(c) (MeKinney 1988) ("Upon the demand of the patient
or of anyone on his behalf... the court shall, or may on its own motion, fix a date for the
hearing..
").
108. See supra note 105. An additional point should be made: judges who refuse to entertain
transfer hearings have legitimate reasons for doing so. Prior to the decision in Savastano, transfer
hearings were regularly heard in the courts. It was the Office of Mental Health that chose to appeal
the Supreme Court, Queens County's ruling to the New York Court of Appeals to ensure that the
administrative hearing be declared constitutional. Now, after all the time and expense that went into
the appeals process, the feeling is that it is inappropriate for the same agency to attempt to bifurcate
the transfer issue in court. The sentiment is "be careful what you ask for, because you may just get
it."
Telephone Interview with Elliott Raines, Law Secretary to Hon. Maxine K. Duberstein, Supreme
Court, Kings County (Oct. 25, 1995).
109. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(c) (McKinney 1988) (mandating that the court
must "fix the date of such hearing at a time not later than five days from the date such notice is
received by the court").
112. See SIEGEL, supra note 90, at 890-92.
113. Id. at 890.
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regulations-in particular 29 NYCRR 517.4-are ultra viresn 4 because
they go beyond the legislature's declared purpose of article 9 to bolster
the rights
of psychiatric patients, not further abrogation of these
15
rights.
Prior to 1964, the only way that an involuntary psychiatric patient
could be transferred against his will was by certification from the
court.116 Article 9 was created with the express purpose of increasing
patients' rights,1 7 and statements concurrent with its passage reinforce
this notion." 8 It is clear that the passage of article 9 was understood to
be a step in the right direction for increasing the rights of psychiatric
patients.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Savastano"9
provides inadequate procedural protection for a patient contesting
transfer. Additionally, it fails to prevent the diversion of scarce resources
from the care and treatment of mentally ill patients. z0
The New York Legislature should mandate a judicial determination
on the issue of transfer. The sending hospital should be required to
prove, by clear and convincing evidence,' that transfer is in the best

114. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990) (defining ultra vires as an
"[a]ct... which is beyond powers conferred.., by law").
115. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
116. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81(2), (3), (5) (repealed 1963).
117. The revamping of the Mental Hygiene Law was the work of the Special Committee of the
Bar of the City of New York. See, e.g., Special Committee to Study Commitment Procedures of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York & Comell Law School, Mental Illness and Due
Process:Report and Recommendations on Admission to Mental Hospitals Under New York Law, at
14 (1962) (stating that the purpose of revamping this area of the law is to ensure that "[a]ny person
hospitalized against his will is entitled to watchful protection of his rights, because he is a citizen
first and a mental patient second").
118. The revamped statutory scheme "preserves due process safeguards of every person who
is admitted to a psychiatric facility for care and treatment." 1964 N.Y. Rules 1968 (statement of
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, upon approving the statutory change).
Executive statements and those of the drafters are not the only evidence of the "rights
bolstering purpose" in the revamping. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Seminar of Supreme Court
Justices on the Subject of Hospitalization of the Mentally Ili, 1965, at 37 (stating that the Justices
were "firmly convinced" that patients should continue to enjoy judicial transfer determinations).
119. Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1990), reargument dismissed, 575 N.E.2d
401 (N.Y. 1991).
120. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605-06 (1979).
121. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31 (McKinney 1988) (mandating the clear and
convincing standard of proof for involuntary commitment); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433
(1979); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 (N.Y. 1986) (mandating the same standard for the
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interests of the patient. Despite the court's characterization, the special
terms created to deal solely with the Mental Hygiene Law are more than
able to condense transfer proceedings into current calendars economically,"z while at the same time ensuring the procedural due process
denied to patients by the current administrative proceeding.
Although judicial determination on the issue of transfer would be
the most economical solution to the current regulatory infirmities, another
option would be to amend 14 NYCRR 517.4 to provide for a hearing

before an impartial administrative officer.1l 3 "A hearing officer who is
employed by the institution or the Office of Mental Health cannot but
feel, rightly or wrongly, that his/her career might be affected by decisions
which overturn administrative decisions in a situation of overcrowded
short-term facilities."' 24 The right to present evidence, cross-examine
witnesses, and have a record made of the proceedings should also be
required.2' As with other administrative proceedings,'26 strict conformity to the rules of evidence would not be required. This "administrative

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication).
122. A hospital within the jurisdiction of a particular special term is given a weekly calendar
day on which the patients requiring hearings on commitment and/or involuntary medication are
"bussed in," or judges travel to the institution for in-hospital proceedings. These hearings tend to be
brief, and most judges require that retention and medication hearings be condensed for a particular
patient. Condensing transfer poses little additional burden on this procedure.
It is interesting to note that when the issue concerns further abrogation of patients' rights,
hospitals advance similar "condensation arguments" regarding economy and efficiency. See, e.g., In
re Lesley B., 567 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1991) ("The hospital maintains that the proceedings
pursuant to § 9.13 [conversion from voluntary to involuntary status] and § 9.33 [involuntary
retention] should be consolidated and such consolidation is not prohibited by statute. Furthermore,
the hospital argues that such consolidation is in the interest of judicial economy... ').
123. It must be remembered that the fear of the "courts being flooded with transfer determinations" is unfounded. It is in a relatively small number of cases that the decision to transfer is
contested.
124. Brief of the American Orthopsychiatric Association and National Federation of Societies
for Clinical Social Work as Amid Curiae at 38, Savastano v. Numberg, 569 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y.
1990).
125. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Jay Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrineof
Issue PreclusionMake an Administrative or ArbitralDeterminationBinding in a Courtof Lav?, 55
FORDHAM L. REv. 63 (1986) (describing the general inapplicability of formal rules of evidence for
administrative hearings).
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solution" would solve the infirmities of
the present system without
127
"unduly burdening the transfer process."
DanielA. Rosen*

127. See supra note 123. But see supra note 121.
* I wish to thank Professor Michael L. Perlin of New York Law School, Dennis Feld, Esq.,
and Elliott Raines, Esq., for their constructive criticism, abundant resources, and advice. Deepest
appreciation to Hon. Maxine K. Duberstein, who gave me the opportunity to see the "special term"
at work. Finally, thank you to Christine A. Cirillo, whose patience, assistance, and understanding
have been a constant source of strength.
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